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CROSS-EXAMINATION

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT

People v. Wilbur 72
(decided October 12, 1995)
Defendant, Jack Wilbur, was convicted of criminal possession
of stolen property in the third and fourth degree and was
sentenced to concurrent prison terms of two to six and one to
three years. 73 defendant appealed and claimed that the admission
of his co-defendant's pretrial statement and grand jury testimony
violated his right to confront all witnesses against him, pursuant
to the Federal 7 4 and New York State 7 5 Constitutions. 7 6 The

Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed the decision of
the trial court and held that not allowing the defendant to
confront his co-defendant at trial did not constitute harmless error

because the co-defendant's pretrial statement and grand jury
77
testimony undoubtedly had a prejudicial effect upon the jury.
A Washington County dairy farmer, Leon Walker, created an

agreement with the defendant to purchase his cattle. 78 The
defendant kept his cows at a farm in Vermont and had his cows
marked with two multi-colored ear tags. 7 9 Another Washington

County dairy farmer, David Perry, kept some of his cows at the
same farm in Vermont and had each cow marked with four ear

tags. 80 Defendant, along with Leon Walker's farm hands Jeremy
Younger and co-defendant Lawrence Butch, herded and
72. 632 N.Y.S.2d 293 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1995).
73. Id. at 294.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
75. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to... be
confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
76. Wilbur, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 294-95.
77. Id. at 295.
78. Id. at 294.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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transported forty cows from the Vermont farm to Walker's farm,
pursuant to the defendant's agreement with Walker. 81 After the
forty cows were transported, Perry noticed that approximately
82
fourteen of his cows were missing from the Vermont farm.
After making inquiries around the farming community, Perry
learned that his cows were on Walker's farm. 83 Though the four
ear tags were removed from Perry's cows, Perry identified his
cows on the Walker farm by locating four holes in each of the
cows' ears.84
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in
admitting the pretrial statement and the grand jury testimony of
his co-defendant Burch. 85 Even though the defendant did not
make a timely objection on this point during the trial in order to
preserve the issue on appeal, the Third Department decided to
' 86
discuss the issue "in the interest of justice."
The court began its analysis by stating that the Confrontation
Clause of both the State and Federal Constitutions "bars the
admission of a codefendant's statement which implicates the
defendant" when the co-defendant does not testify and, therefore,
is not subjected to cross-examination. 87 Although federal
precedent merely implies a harmless error exception to the rule,
New York cases decided under the New York Constitution
81. Id.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
Section
The

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See N.Y. CRim. PROc. LAw § 470.15(6)(a) (McKinney 1994).
470.15(6)(a) provides in pertinent part:
kinds of determinations of reversal or modification deemed to be
made as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(a) That an error or defect occurring at a trial resulting in a
judgment, which error or defect was not duly protested at

trial as prescribed in subdivision two of section 470.05 so as
to present a question of law, deprived the defendant of a fair
trial ....
Id.
87. Wilbur, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 294-95.
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specifically require a "reasonable possibility" that such evidence
had an impact on the jury's determination of guilt.
In Bruton v. United States,88 the petitioner in a joint trial was
convicted of armed postal robbery. 8 9 During the trial, a postal

inspector took the stand and stated that the petitioner's codefendant, Evans, confessed that he and petitioner were the
culprits responsible for the armed robbery. 90 Evans did not take
the stand during the trial; therefore, petitioner was not able to
cross-examine him as to this confession. 9 1 The Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the petitioner's conviction based
on the trial judge's limiting instruction to the jury, telling the
jury members to disregard the confession against the petitioner in
determining his innocence or guilt. 9 2 In affirming the petitioner's
conviction, the Eighth Circuit relied on the rule established in
Delli Paoli v. United States9 3 which allows a court to admit into

evidence admissions made by co-conspirators provided that a
limiting instruction is given to the jury that such admission
should not be used against the petitioner. 94 The United States
Supreme Court in Bruton, however, overruled the rule regarding
co-conspirator admissions set forth in Delli Paoli.95 The Court
88. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
89. Id. at 124.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 136.
92. Id. at 124-25.
93. 352 U.S. 232 (1957). In Delli Paoli, five co-defendants were
convicted of conspiring to deal unlawfuly in alcohol. Id. at 233. The Court
admitted into evidence an admission by one of petitioner's co-conspirators
which implicated the petitioner. Id. The Court instructed the jury that such
evidence was only to be used in determining the guilt of Whitley, one of
petitioner's co-defendants, and not any other co-defendant. Id. at 233-34. The
Court held that the co-conspirator's admission was properly admitted and
stated that "when such a declaration is made by a conspirator after the
termination of the conspiracy, it may be used only against the declarant and
under appropriate instructions to the jury." Id. at 237.
94. Id.
95. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126. The Court stated:
[B]ecause of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the
contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in
determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans' confession in this
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stated that such evidence is unreliable and that "[tjhe unreliability
of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged
accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by
cross-examination." 96 The majority of the Supreme Court
concluded by stating that "in the context of a joint trial we cannot
accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute for
petitioner's constitutional right of cross-examination. The effect
97
is the same as if there had been no instruction at all."
Though the Supreme Court did not specifically state an
exception to the rule elaborated in Bruton, a harmless error
exception can be read into the decision based upon the
circumstances of the specific case. The Court stated that "[t]o
argue, in this situation, that [petitioner's] conviction should
nevertheless stand may be to place too great a strain upon the
[Delli Paoli] rule-at least, where, as here, the other evidence
against [petitioner] is not strong."98 The Court also noted that
the co-defendant's confession "added substantial, perhaps even
critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to
cross-examination." 99 The Court finally indicated that the
incriminating statements were "devastating" to the defendant's
case. 100
The New York State courts generally adhere to the rule in
Bruton. However, the New York courts specifically state that "if
there is no reasonable possibility that such erroneously admitted
evidence contributed to the conviction, the error is considered
harmless and does not warrant reversal. ' 101 In People v.
Hamlin1 02 all three defendants executed written confessions of
joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examination secured by the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. We therefore overrule
Delli Paoli and reverse.
Id.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 136.
Wilbur, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
71 N.Y.2d 750, 525 N.E.2d 719, 530 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1988).
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their respective parts in the murder of defendant Brown's
wife. 103 Only defendant Brown testified during the trial, and
defendants Brown and Hamlin both appealed, arguing that they
were denied their right to confront adverse witnesses because

statements of non-testifying co-defendants were admitted into
evidence. 104 The court stated that when considering whether

there is harmless error in a Bruton-type of case, "the court must
determine on the basis of its own reading of the record the
probable impact of the codefendant's admissions on the 'minds of
an average jury' and whether they were sufficiently prejudicial to
defendant to require reversal of the conviction and a new
trial." 10 5 In making the harmless error assessment, the court
considered a number of factors: (1) "how comprehensive [the]

defendant's statement [was] and whether [defendant's statement]
satisfactorily explain[ed] his or her part in the crime without
reference to the codefendant's statement," (2) "whether it [was]
corroborated or contradicted by other objective evidence," and
(3) "whether defendant... reiterated it on one or more
subsequent occasions." 10 6 After the court applied these factors to
the facts of the case, the majority concluded that there was no

"reasonable possibility" that the jury's determination of
defendant Hamlin's guilt was influenced by Green and Brown's
confessions. 107

103. Id. at 755, 525 N.E.2d at 721, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 75. Defendant Brown
was having problems with his wife and came up with a plan to kill her as well
as inherit approximately $110,000 in life insurance proceeds. Id. at 756-57,
525 N.E.2d at 722, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 76. Brown contacted defendant Hamlin
and offered him $5,000 to kill his wife, but Hamlin subsequently "lost his
nerve" and brought in defendant Green to help him carry out the murder. Id.
at 757, 525 N.E.2d at 722, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 76. On the morning of February
2, 1983, the three defendants met at a local food establishment for breakfast,
and after finishing their respective meals, Hamlin and Green went to Brown's
apartment and stabbed Brown's wife to death. Id. at 757, 525 N.E.2d at 722,
530 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
104. Id. at 755, 525 N.E.2d at 721, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
105. Id. at 758, 525 N.E.2d at 722-23, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
106. Id. at 758, 525 N.E.2d at 723, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
107. Id. at 758-759, 525 N.E.2d at 723, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 77. The court
stated that:
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In Wilbur, the issue at trial was whether the defendant's
possession of Perry's cows was a mistake, or whether it was
intentional. 10 8 The court found that absent the admission of codefendant Burch's grand jury testimony and pretrial statement,
the evidence of guilt against the petitioner was not
"overwhelming," and, therefore, such error in the admission of
this evidence was not harmless. 10 9
In sum, federal and New York law are similar with respect to
treatment of Confrontation Clause violations in joint trials where
a non-testifying co-defendant incriminates the other co-defendant.
Under a federal or state constitutional analysis, the Confrontation
Clause bars the admission into evidence of a co-defendant's
statement which incriminates the defendant whenever the codefendant has not been subjected to cross-examination by the
defendant. The difference, if any, is merely academic. Under a
federal analysis, a harmless error exception is implied. 110 The
New York courts, however, specifically state that the standard to
determine whether there is a constitutional violation is based
upon whether there is no "reasonable possibility" that such
Hamlin's written confession was detailed, complete, and internally
consistent. It was supported by objective evidence establishing that
Brown and Hamlin knew each other and that they were together on the
day of the crime ....

[Hamlin's guilt] was also corroborated by the

recovery of Hamlin's knife from the place where he said he had
discarded it and the recovery of blood-spotted money, stolen from the
Brown apartment, at a store where Hamlin stated he had spent it.
Moreover, Hamlin executed written statements recounting his version of
events twice and in both statements the facts critical to establishing his
guilt were consistent .... Based upon [these consistent statements] and
the objective corroborating evidence, the proof of Hamlin's guilt was
overwhelming and any error in admitting the statements of his
codefendant was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 759, 525 N.E.2d at 723, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 77. The court did, however,
reverse Brown's conviction because the case against him was primarily based
on his confession. Id. "The remaining evidence established a strong motive for
him to want his wife dead and his efforts to establish an alibi but there was
nothing to connect him to the killing except his confession." Id.
108. Wilbur, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
109. Id.
110. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126.
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